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Abstract 
This paper shows that contrarian strategy is applicable for trading long term in China's 
stock market. This was due to evidence that China's stock market showed a winner-loser long 
term reversal. It was found that a zero investment portfolio that buys the past 36 months’ loser 
stocks and short-sells the past 36 months’ winner stocks produced positive  profits due to the 
reversal effect. After the 36-month holding period, past loser stocks gave higher monthly mean 
returns than past winner stocks. This was especially evident for Type A stocks and stocks from 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). The reversal was due to overreaction factors. The way 
investors received and used information influenced the reaction they had towards news and 
their actions in trading. This also posed a challenge to market efficiency. In addition, there was 
also a possible value-growth characteristic attributable to the stocks traded in China. 
Furthermore, analysis using the book-to-market ratio showed that high book-to-market stocks 
(which were usually loser and value stocks) gave higher monthly mean returns than lower book-
to-market stocks (which were usually winner and growth stocks). The reversal did not seem to 
be concentrated only on the month of January due to the tax avoidance incentives; making the 
contrarian strategy applicable throughout the whole year. 
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1. Introduction 
One often ponders about how financial markets work and how some people keep 
gaining and some seem to have no luck. Does luck have anything to do with it? Or, is it just 
having the right information at the right time? And what defines the ‘right time’? This raises the 
old question of “Can one time the equity market?” How does the stock market actually perform 
and is there a systematic way of knowing how the market would react to information? It is well 
known that stock market returns are never stagnant; going up and down according to 
companies’ performance as well as stockholders’ information about the stock and their 
reaction to this information. There is a growing body of literature about the changes in stock 
market returns and many authors claim that future market returns are independent of past 
performance. Much of this literature, however, is still to pass the test of time.  
One of the well-known studies that has become one of the important foundations in 
finance, but remains very questionable, is the study by Fama (1965) called the ‘Efficient Market 
Hypothesis’ (EMH). According to EMH, it is almost impossible to get an abnormal return on the 
basis of information from past returns, even with the aid of publicly and privately available 
information. However, it is believed that this does not hold true. The stock market is not 
completely efficient. There are a number of anomalies in stock markets that cause violations of 
EMH and result in abnormal returns. The contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling 
past winners was first analysed by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). This strategy reflects the 
winners and losers long term reversals in stock market returns. 
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The procedure in the current study, adapted from the study by DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), includes gathering monthly stock market returns. This study on China's market uses up 
to date data from between March 1992 to November 2010. Portfolios are formed each month 
with a formation period of 36 months before and an assumed holding period of 36 months 
after. When the portfolio is formed, the winner and loser stocks will be determined, based on 
their mean returns. Stocks with the highest returns are classified as winners and those with the 
lowest are classified as losers. The contrarian strategy suggests that winners should be sold and 
the losers bought. This strategy is maintained throughout the 36 month holding period. The 
performances of the stocks are then compared. This is undertaken for all the portfolios created 
and then the mean returns for the winners and losers are calculated. As expected, the winning 
stocks have lower mean returns and losing stocks have higher mean returns.  
 
2. Research Problem 
Is there a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) through the ‘winners-losers 
long term reversal’ situation, existing in China's stock market? 
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2.1. Violation of EMH 
EMH suggests that it is impossible to get abnormal returns based on information 
available from the past. For example, if there is information that the price will always go up in 
December, investors would start buying stocks earlier; at the latest, by November, and hold 
them until December before selling them and obtaining abnormal returns. However, if this 
information is available to everyone, the abnormality becomes normal and, hence, in 
November itself, or earlier, the price will go up due to the high demand and the price will go 
down in December if all the stocks are sold then.  Hence, it is impossible to overcome the 
market as the efficiency factors in the stock market ensures that the share prices always reflect 
the information known to the investors. Therefore, according to the EMH, stocks will always 
trade at their fair value and will give normal returns. It seems it is not possible for investors to 
take advantage of the news and purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices 
with the right timing to achieve higher returns than usual. Over the years investors, have 
believed that EMH restricts their ability to earn abnormal profits. However, research for over a 
decade has found that momentum and reversals exist and these situations violate the EMH at 
its most basic level; where in a weak-form efficient market, the performance of portfolios of 
stocks should be independent of their past returns.  Two recent approaches to investments that 
have challenged the weak form of the EMH are the momentum strategy and the contrarian 
strategy which complement the reversal effect. These strategies are based on information from 
past returns of the stocks. The intermediate-term momentum effect was found by Jegadesh 
and Titman (1993). The short term reversal effect was introduced by Jegadesh (1990) and the 
long term reversal effect was first analysed by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). 
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3. Previous Study on Long Run Reversal and a Rationalisation of the 
Phenomenon 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) compared the performance of two groups of US stocks, 
extreme losers and extreme winners, over the period from 1933 to 1982. For each year since 
1933, they formed portfolios of the best and the worst performing stocks over the previous 
three to five years, and then computed the returns of these portfolios over the next three to 
five year holding period. They showed that over those holding periods, stocks that performed 
poorly previously achieved higher returns than stocks that performed well over the same 
period. They found that losers outperformed the market by 19.6% per annum, on average, 
while winners underperformed the market by 5.0% (Gunasekarage & Kot, 2007). DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) concluded that stocks that performed well in the last three to five years (winner 
stocks) will perform badly in the next three to five years, and vice versa. They argued that over 
time, stock prices overreact; the extreme losers will become too undervalued and this will 
result in higher than expected average returns in the future. In contrast, the extreme winners 
will become too expensive and will give lower than average returns. If the loser does well in the 
coming three to five year holding period, even better than the winner’s performance and is, 
potentially, able to give abnormal returns; the contrarian strategy of buying the previous three 
to five year losing stocks and selling winners will be useful.  
How does this work? When there is news that the stock will do well, investors will 
usually under react, hence, not push the price up high enough (Barberis and Thaler, 2000, 
p.1093). Therefore, a short run momentum will occur when the price will be too low as 
compared to its earnings and that results in the stocks giving higher than average returns. 
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Edwards (1968) introduced this phenomenon as ‘conservatism’. People are slow to react to the 
evidence given in the news so the price of the stock now would not reflect the information 
available. The same happens when bad news about good stocks is undermined and results in 
lower average returns. People would like to believe that if a company is doing well, they must 
continue with this success in the future. After a series of these phenomena, investors will then 
learn their lesson but will then overreact to the news. With good news, people will overreact 
and push the price up far too high but realise it is too good to be true, resulting in lower 
average returns, subsequently. With bad news, investors will overreact in such a way that it 
undermines the potential of the stock, but it turns out that they are doing better than 
expected. This phenomenon is identified as a long term reversal. 
 
3.1. Study of Long Run Reversal in China's Stock Market 
The most important part of the study is to find evidence that there is EMH violation in 
China's stock market through long run reversals. The results of this study are beneficial if 
China’s stock analysts/investors to take into account the winners-losers reversal effect while 
investing in China's stock market. It is essential then to see whether the winner- loser long term 
reversal is applicable in this stock market and to what degree it is useful in predicting future 
returns. It provides evidence to prospective investors about the potential for a winners-losers 
long term reversal situation that can be used to beat the market. Consequently, this will enable 
advice be given to investors of China's stocks to follow the simple contrarian strategy of buying 
stocks that were losers in the last three years, so that they can earn superior returns. Hence, 
6 
 
this will boost confidence in investing in China's stock market. This is because if the effect of the 
long run winners-losers reversal holds true, the market is seen as predictable and strategizing 
would work. From a wider perspective, this study shall impact market efficiency and the 
methods that will be used in pricing assets (Chaudhuri & Wu, 2003), especially those in China.  
Furthermore, since this type of study has been carried out in the US and the UK (Yuliang 
& Youwei, 2010), it raises fears about overreaction due to data snooping that cause biases 
(Dissanaike, 1999). Therefore, it is of interest to widen this study to Asia to further validate this 
phenomenon. China is large market that is rising and becoming a dominant influence in the 
world’s economy. China seems to be a good representation of Asia due to the rising economic 
power it has nowadays. Existing studies have concentrated on the developed markets, and yet 
previous researchers have found different results in different markets (Chaudhuri & Wu, 2003). 
In a study by Liu and Lee, where they tried to see whether the Japanese stock market had 
evidence of the momentum strategy; they found that Japan has a reversal effect  instead 
(2001). In contrast, a study done for the New Zealand stock market showed that momentum 
won and it appeared that reversal appeared infrequently in that market (Gunasekarage & Kot, 
2007). These differences could be explained by the culture of the market. The New Zealand 
market concentrates very much on property and since property is, relatively, a much more 
stagnant market, the winners will keep on winning and the losers will keep on losing. However, 
this might change due to the earthquake that hit one of the country’s main cities; Christchurch. 
In contrast, in Japan's market; where the focus is on technology advancement, one company 
had the motivation to pass the winning company and become the leader of innovation to 
sustain a technology-based industry with a high obsolescence rate. This is, however, an 
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unproven opinion. Even though these studies were short to intermediate term, we can say that 
the strategies that can be applied due to the violation of EMH might not be applicable 
universally. Hence, the evaluation needs to be carried out on a country by country basis. 
Therefore, using the emerging market of China enhances studies in this field. This paper will 
empirically prove that China has similar results to those studied by DeBondt and Thaler, in 
1986, for the US market. Furthermore, it also develops further arguments relating to the view 
that EMH does not hold true and that the education syllabus taught to finance students should 
be updated so they become very much aware of these situations.  
 
3.2. Research Question 
Does the winners-losers long term reversal situation exists in China's stock market? 
 
4. Potential Causes of EMH Violations 
4.1. Behavioural Issues in Stock Trading 
The reversal phenomenon starts with common behaviour that can be seen when trading 
in stocks. When investors are faced with making a  decision, which is  usually based on past 
performance (George & Hwang, 2007) and other information available, they  tend to fall prey to 
one of two well-known heuristics: the hot (cold) hand and the gambler’s fallacies (Johnson, 
Tellis & MacInnis, 2005). Hot hand is when a rising (falling) trend is predicted to follow the 
random sequence of the previous data. Gambler’s fallacies are when individuals project a 
reversal outcome based solely on the data and instinct. In 1972, Kahneman and Tversky 
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suggested that both these heuristics arise from consumers’ beliefs that small samples are 
representative of the underlying process (Johnson et al., 2005) for predicting a trend. It is 
human behaviour to believe that when a random sequence shows a pattern, consumers will 
assign meaning to it believing that it is real (Johnson et al., 2005). Gilovich (1991) explains that 
this misconception is then added to their pre-existing theory and creates biases in making 
future decisions (Johnson et al., 2005).   
The theory of hot (cold) hand further supports the idea that EMH is, indeed, being 
violated as trends are being used to make decisions and inducing the outcome. When a stock is 
hot, i.e. doing well over the past few years; consumers who have been looking at this random 
sequence of events will interpret it as a trend and, hence, will determine that the stock will be 
doing fine for the next few years (Johnson et al., 2005). Investors will then become overly 
optimistic about that particular past winner (Johnson et al., 2005). When many investors 
become overly optimistic about the stock, they will tend to overestimate its potential and value 
to grow (George & Hwang, 2007). This will then overvalue the stock price due to the high 
demand that this phenomenon has caused. The theory of cold hand suggests the opposite of 
hot. Losers over the past few years that have had declining earnings will not be popular among 
investors because of the perception that they will not do well in the next few years. Therefore, 
the stock price will be very much undervalued because no one had faith that it will bounce 
back.  
In contrast, investors who believe in the gambler’s fallacy will do the opposite of what 
the past performance suggests. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) in their study believe that people 
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hold on to the idea that in the long term, the probability of the hot (cold) theory will diminish 
(Johnson et al., 2005). It is true that if an investor has both positive and negative earning stocks, 
he will tend to sell the negative trending stocks. However, as time goes on and the length of the 
trend increases, the investor would want to believe that there is a likelihood of a reversal 
(Johnson et al., 2005).  Moreover, with this hope, investors will also tend to hold losers too long 
and sell winners too fast (Johnson et al., 2005).  
This study will predict, if a reversal occurs in the market or not, so that one will not fall 
into a hot (cold) hand or gambler’s fallacy. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) explain in their paper 
that investors should buy the past three years’ losers and sell past three years’ winners. This 
goes against the hot (cold) hand theory; which is a mistake commonly made by investors. With 
this study we can also help investors avoid falling into the gambler’s fallacy because one will 
then have a better idea of the right time to sell and buy.  
 
4.2. Information Dissemination and Assimilation 
There are too many factors that connect a piece of information to the reaction. EMH 
can be violated by the fact that there are diverse means for information to be disseminated and 
assimilated by investors (Balsara & Zheng, 2006). Information about a stock is believed to be 
spread in an epidemic manner. This means that it will be mainly based on how many contacts 
per unit the informant has and how important the information is being relayed (Balsara & 
Zheng). With larger and more important information, there is stronger urgency to relay the 
message. Furthermore, simply because information has been disseminated quickly does not 
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mean that it will be used or immediately assimilated by all investors (Balsara & Zheng, 2006). 
What is more important is the degree of willingness by investors to absorb the information and 
use it in making buying or selling decisions (Balsara & Zheng, 2006). This is consistent with 
Daniel et al.’ s (1998) study that suggests investors' overconfidence and self-attribution play a 
role in the timing of the absorption and use of the information.  Humans have the tendency to 
be overconfident after a series of good outcomes. In contrast, the rare occasion of bad 
outcomes will only be associated with bad luck. This is especially true for investors with a series 
of good outcomes. It is believed that all good outcomes have to be because of the skills that the 
investor might (or might not) have, which potentially increases risk taking due to 
overconfidence. The investor will then not learn from unsuccessful outcomes and will forever 
be overconfident, which results in unrealistic assessments in decision making. Therefore, when 
the information is available it is not necessary for this type of investor to believe immediately 
and act on the information. It will, instead, cause an overreaction to occur when they finally 
come to terms with the news. 
 
5. Literature Review 
5.1. Cause of Reversal 1: Overreaction  
There is already evidence that long-term stock return reversals exist in developed and 
developing markets (Yuliang & Youwei, 2010). Some countries where reversal effects have been 
documented are Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Spain, Brazil and Sri Lanka (Gunasekarage & Kot, 
2007).  
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In EMH, it is believed that all the information available to investors makes it impossible 
for them to gain abnormal profits. However, as an extension to the dissemination and 
assimilation theory discussed above, there are also psychological concepts that are similar to 
Daniel et al. (1998), as introduced by Barberis et al. (1998), called “the representativeness 
heuristic” and “the conservatism bias” which investors inherently experience when interpreting 
new information (Yuliang & Youwei, 2010). A representative heuristic suggests that humans 
give higher probability of an event occurring based on whether a similar occurrence has 
happened in the past. People tend to compare the likely event using their past experience to 
make a similar decision. The experience will have some associated meaning attached to it that 
assists in classifying things when encountering similar situations, thus creating belief that the 
probabilities will be similar. This is followed by the conservatism bias where investors are too 
slow to update their beliefs in response to recent information. This means that they might 
initially under react to news about a firm, so that prices will reflect the new information only 
gradually. These two theories suggest that the initial under reaction causes the momentum and 
the later corrected perception causes the overreaction, which leads to a reversal (Wu & Li, 
2010). When investors correct their priorities, they will experience overreaction in the long 
term. People take their time to react and sometimes they also reacted with resistance and 
resilience that causes under reactions. These concepts explain why EMH would not work 
immediately. Therefore, when EMH does not work perfectly, we can say that there is a chance 
that we can predict future stock performance on the basis of past information. Hence, applying 
the contrarian strategy in a long term-reversal situation is possible. 
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DeBondt and Thaler (1985) explain that if long term reversal effects exist in the market, 
there is a chance that if we buy the previous three years’ losing stocks and hold them for three 
to five years, it  will outperform winning stocks by 25% (George & Hwang, 2007). This was seen 
evident in their previous studies on the US market. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) also explain that 
the reversal strategy is very much connected to the overreaction phenomenon (George & 
Hwang, 2007). The behavioural explanations above should strengthen our understanding of 
overreaction as the cause of reversal. When people receive news about the stock, they make 
systematic mistakes when reacting to it. This phenomenon is explained by the self-attribution 
concept where people only hear or believe what they want to believe, hence, making them 
react to news more slowly, especially when it is not extreme. They also believe in their self-
claimed ability to predict future trends based on their own evaluations of past performances. 
This is when the hot (cold) hand theory comes in. Investors refuse to believe that winners can 
also perform badly and the losers can rise. We know that human behaviour induces the natural 
instinct to buy past winners and sell past losers. Institutions have been seen to be buying stocks 
with the highest previous returns and avoiding stocks with the lowest previous returns 
(Gutierrez Jr. & Prinsky, 2007), regardless of the news or, possibly, a slow reaction to it. 
Therefore, investors are seen as overestimating the winners and underestimating the losers as 
a result of a slow reaction to the news. Then, after taking their own time, they will finally adjust 
to the news and have the tendency to overreact (Yuliang & Youwei, 2010). Overreaction here is 
happening because the news has actually become old and the reaction that has finally come to 
the investors’ senses was a little too late. The peak of overreaction to good news is likely to 
occur when stocks have reached a long-term high, when the good news is about to expire, and 
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the peak for overreaction to bad news is when the prices are near long term lows (George & 
Hwang, 2007). Thus, this makes the reversal of stock performances most likely to occur after 
those peaks. Therefore, reversal happens when investors learn from the past that the 
overreaction did not bring them an abnormal profit (Yuliang & Youwei, 2010). Bayesian learning 
models suggest that investors put too much weight on extreme observations that may generate 
overreaction in beliefs about both good and bad news. Reversals occur when investors learn 
that they overreacted in the past (Wu & Li, 2010). Since it is believed that investors learn from 
their past reactions and, subsequently, change their decisions resulting in a reversal, it is 
important to assess whether overreaction does impact the reversal and whether those 
investors actually learn from that past overreaction or not.  
However, it has to be noted that long term-reversal is likely to arise only when markets 
include a sufficiently large number of traders who are willing to trade on the basis of price 
movements alone. Individuals are said to have the tendency to be contrarian traders due to 
contradictory information they possess (Bloomfield, Tayler & Zhou, 2009). 
 
5.2. Cause of Reversal 2: Tax Avoidance Incentives 
The above discussion mainly focuses on the potential behavioural reasons of how 
reversals can occur. In extension to those discussions, we now consider rational explanations. 
One of the rational explanations for this reversal phenomenon is the investors’ rational 
behaviour to strategically avoid tax (George & Hwang, 2007; Wu & Li, 2010). Investors holding 
winners are reluctant to immediately sell their stocks as selling these stocks will realise capital 
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gains and capital gains tax will need to be paid (George & Hwang, 2007; Wu & Li, 2010). The 
higher the appreciation of the stocks, the higher the gain will be, but the higher will be the tax 
on the gain (Wu & Li, 2010). The investors will sell those winning stocks if the selling prices are 
marked up to cover the tax, making the price of the winners rise to the point of being 
overvalued. However, this price would not reflect the true intrinsic value of the stocks and so 
would have lower returns than expected (George & Hwang, 2007). The question is, knowing 
this, who would want to buy the highly marked up stocks? It is believed that as time passes 
there will be buyers who are willing to, and can, take the risk to pay the marked up prices to 
obtain the embedded gains in the stocks (George & Hwang, 2007). Also, as investors with a 
locked-in gains approach at the end of their investment period, the benefit to further defer 
taxes on gains decreases (George & Hwang, 2007) making them eventually sell off the stock. 
The new owners, however, will realise that the embedded gain is not as high as the value paid; 
hence they would be willing later on to sell without demanding large premiums (George & 
Hwang, 2007). When this happens the stock will reduce to its real value and to a real 
perception of its actual earnings. The correction for the overreaction occurs and, by right, stock 
returns should then exhibit reversals in the long term (Wu & Li, 2010).  
One of the important implications from previous studies is that the incentive to avoid 
tax seems to be more applicable to winner stock reversals as investors are reluctant to pay 
capital gains tax and, therefore, losers seem to be earning more by having higher reversals 
mostly in January (Wu & Li, 2010). However, if an investor incurs any capital loss in the previous 
tax-year, the amount of loss has a “carry over” feature that can offset current or future capital 
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gains. Losers should have positive returns in January, a notion that investors use to exploit 
losers to establish tax-loss positions at the end of the tax year (Wu & Li, 2010).  
Analysis on reversals, excluding the month of January, is undertaken to check whether a 
tax avoidance incentive is applicable to China's stock market reversal. It is seen that when the 
month of January is excluded, the reversal still remains strong and so the reversal in China's 
market could not be explained using tax avoidance reasoning. This is despite the fact that China 
not imposing capital gains tax. By right, when capital gains tax is imposed, the market is highly 
influenced by the incentive to avoid tax so the reversal should occur often in the month of 
January. Therefore, if January were to be taken out from the analysis, the reversal should have 
much less an effect or even be absent. This is proven in a study on the Hong Kong market 
where capital gains tax is non-existent. Hong Kong did not show any reversal with or without 
the month of January included (George & Hwang, 2007). With no capital gains tax, there was no 
reversal in the Hong Kong market (Wu & Li, 2010). The opposite is obviously found in China's 
market as it does have capital gains tax. Therefore, an analysis excluding the month of January 
shows that there is a lower reversal effect; the significance of this will be discussed later in the 
results.  
5.3. Cause of Reversal 3: Value-Growth Characteristics 
Value-growth characteristics are believed to provide better explanations for long term 
stock returns (Wu & Li, 2010; Yuliang & Youwei, 2010). The intrinsic value of a stock can be 
measured using the book-to-market value of the stock (Wu & Li, 2010). This is a ratio where the 
book value is divided by the market value.  A ratio higher than 1 is considered high and most 
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likely means the stock is undervalued and if the ratio is less than 1 (which is considered low), it 
is potentially overvalued. Book-to-market is one of the variables used to capture financial 
distress (Piotroski, 2000). A high book-to-market means that there is a tendency that the 
company has higher costs in covering its financial distress and, hence, will be seen to be 
pessimistic about having poor future earnings. This then makes the high-book-to market stocks 
tend to be undervalued. However, they will achieve a higher mean return because, according to 
Fama and French (2006), they should have returns that can compensate the additional 
systematic risk carried (Piotroski, 2000; Wu & Li, 2010). Therefore, high-book-to-market stocks 
would have a high expected return relative to low book-to-market stocks that have, on average, 
a low distress cost (Wu & Li, 2010). This then has caused the high book-to-market stocks to 
outperform low book-to-market stocks (Piotroski, 2000). An analysis separating China's stocks 
into low and high book-to-market ratios shows the argument is true. 
For the analysis of the high-low, book-to-market ratio, the winners and losers of each 
respective group are analysed again to see the reversals in their returns. Winners are more 
likely to be growth stocks, while losers are usually value stocks (Wu & Li, 2010). If a stock is 
measured by value, it means that its intrinsic value is measured according to recent changes in 
the firms’ fundamentals, using historical financial statements (Lander, 2006). In contrast, the 
growth stocks are generally overvalued (Wu & Li, 2010). This is a result of the mismeasured 
relationship between risk and return (Wu & Li, 2010) and market mispricing between the 
observed return of stocks. When the winner is performing well, there is a momentum effect 
existing; the investors believe that the stock will remain doing well.  This results in the winner 
stocks being overvalued. The reason behind this is that growth stock is usually measured based 
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on subjective non-financial information such as forecasts of sale and the resultant cash flow 
(Lander, 2006). 
According to this discussion, the loser (value) stocks should have higher mean returns 
than the winner (growth) stocks, and these winners and losers under the high book-to-market 
value should, overall, have higher mean returns than the low book-to-market stocks. 
 
6. Data 
The monthly data for this study were collected from the China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research database (CSMAR). One important question here is how much market 
data needs to be used? Dissanaike, in his study (1997), includes time-varying risk and restricted 
his study to 1000 of the larger and better known UK companies, those that are more actively 
traded (Dissanaike, 1999). He explained that this limitation minimises the biases created by the 
fact that some stocks are not actively traded and would, therefore, probably not show the 
reversal effect (Dissanaike, 1999) or any other predictable trend due to insufficient data. 
Investors also are generally more interested in engaging with information about larger listed 
companies because they are more attainable (Dissanaike, 1999). Even though this way of doing 
things might create biases of its own, it is reasonable and should be taken into consideration 
when choosing the data to include. Therefore, for this study, it is decided to use the monthly 
returns from two stock markets in China; the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE). The data available from CSMAR that are useful and available for this 
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study are for the period from March 1992 to November 2010. The total numbers of stocks 
involved during this research period are 1,015 with total number of 195,990 observations. 
 These results are analysed in various levels. Firstly, analysis is done for the overall data, 
and then by the stocks from SZSE and SSE separately, to see which exchange contributes to the 
reversal the most. Lastly, the analysis will look into whether the results will remain the same 
when Type A and Type B stocks are separated. Type A stocks are the ordinary stocks that are 
freely traded in Chinese currency, Renminbi, by mainland residents only while Type B stocks are 
foreign investment stocks that have a face value in Renminbi but are traded in foreign 
currencies. These Type B stocks are from overseas, mostly from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
and can be traded by both local and overseas investors. The results will also be separated into 
three time groups. Each time period reflects the economic situation faced by the China stock 
market at the time. Hence this can, to some extent, explain the impact on the degree of 
reversal. 
 
7. Method 
The method used to see whether this long-term reversal occurs in China’s stock market 
is similar to what DeBondt and Thaler (1986) used in their study of the US stock market's long 
term reversal.  
An examination of the excess return behaviour of winner and loser portfolios will be 
carried out by taking the monthly returns for the period chosen; March 1992 to November 
2010. The profitability of the winner-loser reversal was calculated using a 36 month formation 
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and holding period return. The first portfolio was formed on March 1995 with a formation 
period of April 1992 to March 1995. The monthly formation period returns were distributed 
among ten equally weighted rankings where number (portfolio) one was the ‘loser’ and number 
(portfolio) ten was the ‘winner’. The performing one was the winner and, at the other end, the 
one that was not performing well was the loser. The profitability of the stocks were calculated 
every month for the 36 month formation period and then ranked from winners to losers. The 
average for each rank was taken to make up the winner and loser for the portfolio. These 
portfolios were held for another 36 months. For the first portfolio, the holding period was April 
1995 to March 1998. The stock returns after the 36 month period were again analysed to give 
the monthly mean returns and the mean differences between the losers and winners; the 
reversal effect. The second portfolio was formed on April 1995 with a formation period of May 
1992 to April 1995. It was formed on n= March 1995, and for the second portfolio it will be n+1 
month and n+2 for the third portfolio and so on. This continued until the last portfolio of n+ 
152= November 2007, where the formation period was December 2004 to November 2007; 
enabling  the analysis to be undertaken until the end of the holding period, December 2007 to 
November 2010, available in the data. The total number of portfolios formed was  153. This was 
undertaken for all portfolios created and the mean returns for the winners and losers were 
calculated. As expected, the winner stocks have lower mean returns and loser stocks have 
higher mean returns. The analysis of the data to calculate the mean return was carried out 
using Statistical Analysis Software (SAS).  
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8. Results 
8.1. Overall Results 
The results are read in terms of mean returns on a per month basis. Using the contrarian 
strategy of selling the winner and buying the loser, the results showed how much was earned 
on average by those two portfolios every month after holding the portfolio for a 36 month 
period. In general, for China’s stock market, holding the losers and selling the winners were 
generally very profitable with 88% to 100% of the months showing reversal.  The difference 
between the loser and the winner was also looked at to see how profitable the strategy was. 
In reference to Table 1, 153 portfolios were formed every month for the periods 
between March 1995 and November 2007. Each month’s portfolio winners and losers were 
held for 36 months and the return was recorded. The mean was calculated for every portfolio’s 
winners and losers returns.  It was shown that holding the winners gave a mean return of 
1.178% per month as compared to the mean return of 2.432% per month when holding losers. 
The losers have higher mean returns by 1.254% per month. This proved that reversal did occur 
in the overall China stock market with, all the 135 months of the winner and loser portfolios 
being held, 93.15% showing reversal. The following graph shows the mean returns trend for the 
losers and winners. It can be clearly seen that the losers get  higher mean returns most of the 
time in China's stock market. Even when losses occurred, it can be seen that the losses by the 
losers were slightly lower, on average, than the winners. 
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Graph 1: Mean Returns for Loser and Winner Stocks for Long Term period in China’s Stock Market 
 The results were also divided into the data taken from the respective exchanges 
(refer to Tables 2 and 3 in the appendices). For SSE, the mean winner return was slightly under 
the overall mean recorded at 1.134% per month and for SZSE it was at 0.976% per month, 
making it even lower. However, SSE losers had monthly mean returns of 2.594%, slightly higher 
than the overall monthly mean return of 2.432% and much higher than the mean loser returns 
for SZSE by 0.519% per month. SSE seemed to have a higher percentage of loser-winner 
differences, at 1.46% per month as compared to SZSE (1.099% per month) and even higher than 
from the overall mean difference (1.254% per month), making the exchange a potentially 
higher contributor to the reversal. 
Further, the results were separated into the underlying data made up of Type A and 
Type B stocks. In reference to Table 4, for Type A stock, the winners’ monthly mean return was 
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1.309% and showed a lower return to the losers' monthly mean returns by 0.802%. The loser 
for Type A stock showed a higher monthly mean return, at 2.111%, as compared to the mean 
loser return of Type B stocks, at 1.758%, per month (Refer Table 5). In addition Type A stock 
showed a higher reversal than Type B stock by 0.413% per month. This showed that Type A 
would be the higher contributor to the overall reversal. 
The reversal analysis for the whole China stock market was also divided into three time 
periods. Statistically, there was a tendency that of all 153 data used, the reversal only 
happened at certain periods of time. Therefore, the separation was mainly a means to reduce 
the statistical bias and reduce the likelihood effect of data snooping biases. The first group was 
the first two-fifths of the data, the second group was the next two-fifths of the data and the 
final one-fifth made up the last group. With this separation, the degree of the reversal for each 
period can be compared and the contribution of each group towards the reversal can be 
determined. Each time period also reflected the economic situation faced by China's stock 
market at the time. Hence, to some extent, this explained the impact on the degree of the 
reversal.  
The formation months from March 1995 to December 1999 (Table 6) gave the mean 
returns for the holding period from April 1995 and December 2002. This covered the immediate 
period of the impact from the Asian financial crises that began in July 1997. The Asian financial 
crises did not affect China much, as it was during those periods that there was high GDP growth 
in China, although it slowed down slightly in 1998 and 1999. The growth was attributed to 
heavy industries, infrastructure rises and cheap labour (Overholt, 2010). China survived the 
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crises well due to its increased exports. The growth was, however, immediate and had a large 
impact but then come to obsolescence too soon (Overholt, 2010) counteracting the rapid 
growth and returning to a stable and well to do economy. For this period, it can be seen that 
the losers had higher monthly mean returns of 2.353%, more than the average winners’ 
earnings.  From Table 7, the results of the reversals were the mean from February 2000 to 
December 2007. This included the time when the United States had their recession that also 
affected China’s export industries. This slowed the growth and worsened China’s economy. It 
was believed that any slowdown in China's growth would have a large impact on its economy. 
Economists have warned that China could face a recession if its growth rate were to slow to 
even as low as 6% (Chiu, n.d.). There was also growing worry that at that time China was facing 
a bubble waiting to bust (Fleming, 2007). As can see from the results in Table 7, the winners 
even had a negative mean return over that time; a mean loss of 0.241% per month and the 
reversal was not as high; down by 1.824% per month from the previous group period of 
reversal, at 2.353% per month. Furthermore, this period also included the start of the global 
financial crisis that cut the price of the Chinese stock market in half (Jubak, 2010). It could be 
said, although this has not been proven correct, that when the economic situation was at a 
downturn in China, the reversal became less apparent, being the lowest at a 0.529% per month 
mean reversal effect. Table 8 shows the return breakdowns in the holding period of February 
2005 to November 2010. In this period the effect of the global financial crisis had a strong 
effect; however, the subsequent recovery quickly took place at a later period making the period 
stabilise and pushing the market towards another bubble (Jubak, 2010). As seen in Table 8, the 
loser monthly mean return was 3.715% and the winner was close to this, at 3.038% per month. 
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Both winners and losers seemed to be enjoying the growth and improving economic 
environment that China was experiencing during this period. In this kind of growing 
environment, it was seen that the reversal was present in all months.  
It seemed likely that when the economy was stable and doing well, the results showed a 
very high tendency (maybe even at its highest) of reversal, followed by the second highest 
when it was at a growing period in the economy. Although, in the growth period, both winners 
and losers seemed to be doing well as their mean returns were similar. The reversal’s effect 
was to be at its least when the economy was facing a slump, although it was still visible and the 
losers seemed to be doing much better than the losers in terms of getting positive returns. The 
following graph shows the trend discussed. 
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Graph 2: The Reversal Trend in China’s Stock Market over the Long Term 
It has been established from the above that the earlier period of the data used for the 
analysis had a higher effect on the reversal and the least effect was shown in the second group. 
Similar trends were shown with the separation of the whole China stock market into its 
respective exchanges; SSE (Tables 9 to 11) and SSE (Tables 12 to 14) according to those three 
periods.  It was notable, however, in the first time group (Table 9), the SSE loser stocks showed 
very significant monthly mean returns of 4.32%, 3.025% higher than the winners’ monthly 
mean returns. This reversal difference was 1.199% per month higher than of the SZSE’s loser-
winner difference. This proved the earlier conclusion that SSE, on average, was still the biggest 
contributor to the loser’s reversal in the complete stock market in China. Consistent evidence 
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was shown by the SSE loser-winner difference still being higher for the next two time periods. 
SSE also showed almost double loser monthly mean returns for the first two time periods as 
compared to SZSE, which probably explained the higher reversal difference. 
Similar earning trends were shown with the separation of the Type A and Type B stocks 
in the three time periods. The earlier period of data used for the analysis had a higher effect 
from reversal and the least effect was shown in the second group. These effects are shown in 
Tables 15 to 17 for the three time periods for Type A stocks and Tables 18 to 20 for the three 
time periods for Type B stocks. The fact that Type A stocks gave higher differences in the 
winners and losers was the same at the first group time period difference (which was also the 
highest for the whole period), at 1.192% per month, (in Table 15) as compared to only 0.492% 
per month for Type B stock difference, as shown in Table 18. The lowest reversal difference was 
shown by Type B stocks in the second group, recorded at 0.074% (Table 19), that are 0.403% 
lower than for Type A stock (Table 16) in the same time period. However, it must be noted that 
when all results in the second time period showed a negative return, Type B stock showed a 
positive monthly mean return during that period of 0.396% (Table 19).  
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8.2. January Effect Bias Results 
A study by George and Hwang (2007) suggested that the first analysis should include the 
month of January and then be followed by an analysis without the month of January. This was 
necessary because many markets showed that there was a phenomenon called the January 
effect. In January, there will be major deviations in earnings, be it huge loses or huge profits 
(Gunasekarage & Kot, 2007; Gutierrez Jr. & Prinsky, 2006). Contrarian strategies have 
generated significant abnormal returns in the month of January (Gunasekarage, 2007). There 
was evidence in the US data analysed that strong loser reversals came exclusively from January 
(Figelman, 2007) and outside of January there was no loser reversal effect (George & Hwang, 
2007). In January, the reversal should be stronger, hence, when the results were modified to 
exclude that month, the reversal should not be as strong, especially for the losers’ reversal 
(Figelman, 2007). This was because the losers had a higher tendency for reversal. This bias can 
be attributed to the second cause of reversal, as discussed in the literature review.  
 The data was analysed again without the month of January’s returns. It was 
excluded from the overall data used from March 1995 to November 2010, cutting down n to 
141. When the portfolio were formatted, the formation period and holding periods remained at 
36 months but without the months of January being included in the calculation, making it 33 
months instead. There was no portfolio formatted in the month of January, which explained the 
reduction in the number of months used calculate the mean of returns down to 141 from 153 
months in the initial analysis. From Table 21, the analysis without January, it can be seen that 
the winners' monthly mean return was 1.029% as compared to 1.178% from the initial analysis 
that included January. The loser also earned slightly less without the month of January, by 
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0.175%. Overall, when January was included in the analysis, the profitability of holding losers 
instead of winners was around 1.254% per month, which was 0.026% higher than when January 
month was excluded. Even though, when January was excluded the degree of reversal reduced 
from 93.15% of the months to only 82% of the months, the 0.026% difference was not 
significant. Hence, the China’s stock market can be seen as not having a January effect bias in its 
reversal. Therefore, the theory of tax avoidance incentives could not satisfactorily explain 
China’s stock market long term reversal. However, it was proven that the losers did tend to 
reverse more in January compared to the winners as they had 0.175% monthly mean returns 
short without the month of January included in the analysis as compared to only 0.149% per 
month short for the winners. This agreed with the evidence from the US data analysed that 
strong loser reversals came more from January. 
 
9. Discussion 
1. Yuliang & Youwei (2010) undertook a study to explain the long term reversal effect. Their 
three competing explanations were past performance, value-growth characteristics and tax-
motivated incentives, as discussed in the literature review. It can be understood now that the 
reversal was not attributed solely to an overreaction to past performance. However, the 
analysis of the effect of January bias has shown that even without the month of January 
included in the analysis, the reversal was still significant. This meant that the incentive to avoid 
tax by the winners did not explain all the reversal effect in China's stock market. China seemed 
to have an overreaction effect on its side. This was combined with the value-growth 
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characteristic in buying a stock. An investor can pick between the stock that was true to its 
value or was growing. In reference to Table 22, the low book-to-market value stocks that 
signified lower financial distress costs had a lower monthly mean returns than the high book-to-
market value stocks, as shown in Table 23. In general, both winners and losers with high book-
to-market values have higher mean returns. The winner and loser stocks that supposedly have 
higher financial distress costs (high book-to-market) had monthly mean returns of 1.383% and 
1.921%, respectively. This was both higher than the monthly mean return for stocks that have 
lower financial distress costs (low book-to-market) with the winner only having a 0.647% 
monthly mean return and the loser having a monthly mean return of only 1.705%. Although, 
the reversal was higher with low book-to-market stocks recorded at 1.058% as compared to the 
0.538% reversal with high book-to-market stocks. Losers for high book-to-market had the 
highest mean return of 1.921% per month proving that the value (loser) stock for the high 
book-to-market stocks had a chance of getting the larger return. The growth stock had the 
lowest earnings even when the stocks had a low book-to market ratio at only 0.647% of 
monthly mean returns, which was 0.274% lower than the loser with high book-to-market ratio. 
To some extent, it can be said that the value-growth characteristic was attributable to the 
reversal in China’s stock market. The growth (winner) stocks having the lowest mean return 
signified the overvaluation of their worth. The value (loser) stocks were doing so much better 
than the rest even with the high book-to-market ratio value. However, this analysis has many 
limitations due to the insufficient availability of data to make a solid argument about whether 
the reversal was due to the growth value characteristic or not.  
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2. Calculating all these data and turning it into a prediction of a trend signalling future expected 
returns can assist in gaining abnormal returns. However, bear in mind that there was a 
significant cost that came with rebalancing the portfolio every time it was needed (Figelman, 
2007). It will be difficult to incorporate this into the expected return models. Therefore, this 
study was mainly based on predicting a potential long term reversal trend in China’s stock 
market formulated from past data that hopefully and potentially could be repeated in the 
future. It was hard for investors to keep track of all the news and earnings to actually predict 
future returns given limited budgets to pay for the costs associated with gathering the 
information. For China, the duty tax was 0.1% and the brokerage fee was 0.3% for selling and 
buying. Therefore, when the contrarian strategy of buying losers and selling winners was 
undertaken for each portfolio, there were 0.8% transaction fees in total that needed to be paid. 
After the 36 month period, another 0.8% needed to be paid to realise the profit for holding the 
loser and buying back the winner at a lower price. This was then 1.6% per transaction 
altogether to maintain one portfolio. This figure, divided into 36 months, will have an average 
of 0.0004444% effect on the mean return. This, however, should not have a significant effect on 
the return. However, just imagine if for every portfolio, which was constructed every month, 
was updated every month for the 36 month holding period by always buying the outermost 
loser and selling the outermost winner, the cost will be 0.8% times 18 (let’s say it was updated 
every two months) = 14.4%. This figure divided by the 36 month period was 0.4% per month, 
which was quite ridiculous as the cost to rebalance the portfolio was almost half the monthly 
average return. Therefore, the idea to always buy the loser and sell the winner can only be 
done moderately to ensure the costs did not outweigh the benefits.  
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10. Limitation 
It has to be admitted that the data used for this study were comparatively smaller than 
any other study undertaken to prove this reversal. For example, the study by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) used data from 57 years; January 1926 to December 1982, while this study only 
used 18 years and 9 months of data.  This was due to the limited data availability from China’s 
stock market. This exposed this study to a high potential for statistical bias for not having 
enough samples to further strengthen the results. Perhaps, this study can be repeated in over 
more than twenty years to prove that the contrarian strategy was still usable in China’s stock 
market.  
 
11. Conclusion 
There was a long term reversal effect in China's stock market using earnings data from 
March 1992 to November 2010. This long term reversal was a violation of the EMH, which 
stated there was no way the future market can be predicted based on information from past 
performance, along with public and private information. There were some human behaviour 
issues that induced the possibility of this violation. Such issues discussed were the hot (cold) 
hand theory and the gambler’s fallacy. This, along with information dissemination and 
assimilation lagging seen in human nature that causes news not to impact straight away on the 
value of the stocks, helped explain the possibility of this reversal. After investors adjust to the 
news, they tended to overreact and these reactions were usually at a time when the effect of 
the news had already achieved its peak and it was considered too late, hence, causing the 
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reversal to occur.  These reversal effects were very much attributable to the overreaction effect 
although the value-growth characteristic using the book-to-market value to a limited extent 
also supported the cause of the reversal in China’s stock market. The loser with a high book-to-
market ratio had the highest monthly mean return while the winner with the low book-to-
market ratio had the lowest. This proved that stocks with high book-to-market ratios have 
higher reversals than stocks with low book-to-market ratios and value stocks have higher mean 
returns than growth stocks as growth stocks tended to be more overvalued. 
The long term reversal was proven significant in the study of China's stock market with 
the mean returns for the losers being 1.254% per month higher than the mean returns for the 
winners. This was especially evident in the SSE where there was a 0.361% per month higher 
reversal than for stocks from SZSE. Type A stocks, which were only available to the locals, have 
larger differences between the loser and winner stocks by 0.413% per month compared to Type 
B stocks, which were available to both locals and outsiders. This gave a slight advantage for the 
locals to make use of the contrarian strategy. With this evidence it can be advised that the 
contrarian strategy will definitely bring about abnormal profits to investors in China's stock 
market. 
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13. Appendices  
Portfolios are formed every month between March 1995 and November 2007, hence, n= 153 
months. Mean returns are the monthly average returns after the 36-month holding period in 
percentage terms. 
 
Table 1: Reversal in China’s Stock Market  
 
Variable N (months) 
Mean Returns 
% 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 153 1.178 6.86 <.0001 
Loser 153 2.432 12.01 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 153 1.254 9.77 <.0001 
Port. 2 153 2.129 12.15 <.0001 
Port. 3 153 1.93 12.06 <.0001 
Port. 4 153 1.934 11.93 <.0001 
Port. 5 153 1.867 11.54 <.0001 
Port. 6 153 1.718 11.12 <.0001 
Port. 7 153 1.486 9.67 <.0001 
Port. 8 153 1.494 9.6 <.0001 
Port. 9 153 1.431 8.99 <.0001 
>0 93.15% 
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Portfolios for Tables 2 to 5 are formed for almost all months between March 1995 and 
November 2007, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Reversal in SSE  
 
 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t|  
Winner 149 1.134 6.52 <.0001  
Loser 149 2.594 11.84 <.0001  
Loser - Winner 149 1.46 8.62 <.0001  
Port. 2 149 2.31 12.44 <.0001  
Port. 3 149 2.042 12.09 <.0001  
Port. 4 149 1.844 11.31 <.0001  
Port. 5 149 1.716 10.58 <.0001  
Port. 6 149 1.704 10.39 <.0001  
Port. 7 149 1.596 10.02 <.0001  
Port. 8 149 1.482 9.31 <.0001  
Port. 9 149 1.456 8.63 <.0001  
>0   81.88%      
Table 3: Reversal in SZSE  
 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 151 0.976 5.63 <.0001 
Loser 151 2.075 10.03 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 151 1.099 7.18 <.0001 
Port. 2 151 1.765 9.69 <.0001 
Port. 3 151 1.658 9.77 <.0001 
Port. 4 151 1.65 10.22 <.0001 
Port. 5 151 1.598 9.76 <.0001 
Port. 6 151 1.785 10.46 <.0001 
Port. 7 151 1.696 10.32 <.0001 
Port. 8 151 1.53 9.28 <.0001 
Port. 9 151 1.414 8.62 <.0001 
>0   84.10%     
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Table 4: Reversal in China’s Type A stocks 
 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 151 1.309 6.89 <.0001 
Loser 151 2.111 10.99 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 151 0.802 15.29 <.0001 
Port. 2 151 1.989 11.5 <.0001 
Port. 3 151 1.975 11.42 <.0001 
Port. 4 151 2.01 11.6 <.0001 
Port. 5 151 1.841 11.15 <.0001 
Port. 6 151 1.844 10.84 <.0001 
Port. 7 151 1.713 10.58 <.0001 
Port. 8 151 1.65 9.87 <.0001 
Port. 9 151 1.46 8.57 <.0001 
>0   94.00%     
Table 5: Reversal in China’s Type B stocks 
 
 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 149 1.368 8.12 <.0001 
Loser 149 1.758 8.68 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 149 0.389 2.88 0.0046 
Port. 2 149 2.2 11.21 <.0001 
Port. 3 149 2.095 10.77 <.0001 
Port. 4 149 2.028 10.3 <.0001 
Port. 5 149 1.844 8.68 <.0001 
Port. 6 149 1.819 9.25 <.0001 
Port. 7 149 1.565 8.23 <.0001 
Port. 8 149 1.421 8.01 <.0001 
Port. 9 149 1.298 7.9 <.0001 
>0   66.40%     
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Tables 6 to 8 show the reversal for China’s stock market separated into three time periods. 
The months when the portfolios are formed are shown by the formation dates beginning 
every table, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Reversal in China’s whole stock market 
(Formation dates: March 1995 - December 1999) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean Returns t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 58 1.522 8.74 <.0001 
Loser 58 3.875 16.95 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 58 2.353 8.71 <.0001 
Port. 2 58 2.942 18.47 <.0001 
Port. 3 58 2.418 25.28 <.0001 
Port. 4 58 2.472 20.63 <.0001 
Port. 5 58 2.448 17.34 <.0001 
Port. 6 58 2.13 18.49 <.0001 
Port. 7 58 1.692 13.36 <.0001 
Port. 8 58 1.878 16.15 <.0001 
Port. 9 58 1.765 15.5 <.0001 
>0   91.4%     
 
Table 7:  Reversal in the China’s whole stock market a  
(Formation dates: January 2000 - December 2004) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 60 -0.241 -0.85 0.3964 
Loser 60 0.288 1.03 0.306 
Loser - Winner 60 0.529 6.53 <.0001 
Port. 2 60 0.369 1.38 0.174 
Port. 3 60 0.41 1.56 0.1245 
Port. 4 60 0.398 1.51 0.1365 
Port. 5 60 0.349 1.33 0.1871 
Port. 6 60 0.329 1.28 0.2044 
Port. 7 60 0.228 0.89 0.3774 
Port. 8 60 0.147 0.55 0.5839 
Port. 9 60 0.116 0.41 0.6837 
>0   88.33%     
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Tables 9 to 11 show the reversal for China’s stock market separated into three time periods 
for SSE. The months when the portfolios are formed are shown in the formation dates 
beginning every table, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
Table 9: Reversal in SSE  
(Formation dates: March 1995 - December 1999) 
Variable N  
(months
) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 54 1.295 9.18 <.0001 
Loser 54 4.32 14.56 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 54 3.025 8.63 <.0001 
Port. 2 54 3.407 16.72 <.0001 
Port. 3 54 2.685 20.02 <.0001 
Port. 4 54 2.171 20.22 <.0001 
Port. 5 54 2.02 12.61 <.0001 
Port. 6 54 2.061 11.82 <.0001 
Port. 7 54 2.02 17.42 <.0001 
Port. 8 54 1.964 21.52 <.0001 
Port. 9 54 2.059 14.51 <.0001 
>0   88.88%     
Table 8:  Reversal in China’s whole stock market 
(Formation dates: January 2005 – November 2007) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Winner 35 3.038 14.21 <.0001 
Loser 35 3.715 17.91 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 35 0.676 10.17 <.0001 
Port. 2 35 3.802 17.76 <.0001 
Port. 3 35 3.728 17.43 <.0001 
Port. 4 35 3.677 17.44 <.0001 
Port. 5 35 3.505 17.42 <.0001 
Port. 6 35 3.416 16.34 <.0001 
Port. 7 35 3.298 16.04 <.0001 
Port. 8 35 3.166 15.3 <.0001 
Port. 9 35 3.131 14.92 <.0001 
>0 
 
100.00% 
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Table 10: Reversal in  SSE  
(Formation dates: January 2000 - December 2004) 
Variable N  
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 60 -0.177 -0.61 0.5449 
Loser 60 0.419 1.51 0.1376 
Loser - Winner 60 0.596 4.58 <.0001 
Port. 2 60 0.468 1.76 0.0828 
Port. 3 60 0.473 1.77 0.0821 
Port. 4 60 0.451 1.69 0.0958 
Port. 5 60 0.408 1.56 0.125 
Port. 6 60 0.378 1.46 0.1487 
Port. 7 60 0.233 0.88 0.3808 
Port. 8 60 0.071 0.27 0.7917 
Port. 9 60 -0.004 -0.01 0.9888 
>0   78.33%     
 
Table 11: Reversal in SSE  
(Formation dates: January 2005 – November 2007) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 35 3.132 13.28 <.0001 
Loser 35 3.659 18.33 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 35 0.526 4.99 <.0001 
Port. 2 35 3.777 18.7 <.0001 
Port. 3 35 3.742 17.68 <.0001 
Port. 4 35 3.731 17.22 <.0001 
Port. 5 35 3.488 17.77 <.0001 
Port. 6 35 3.429 16.15 <.0001 
Port. 7 35 3.281 15.23 <.0001 
Port. 8 35 3.156 15.2 <.0001 
Port. 9 35 3.03 13.98 <.0001 
>0   77.14%     
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Tables 12 to 14 show the reversal for China’s stock market separated into three time periods 
for SZSE. The months when the portfolios are formed are shown in the formation dates 
beginning every table, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
Table 12: Reversal in SZSE  
 (Formation dates: March 1995 - December 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 56 1.101 5.25 <.0001 
Loser 56 2.927 10.1 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 56 1.826 4.79 <.0001 
Port. 2 56 2.103 10.21 <.0001 
Port. 3 56 1.873 10.1 <.0001 
Port. 4 56 1.798 12.29 <.0001 
Port. 5 56 1.809 10.98 <.0001 
Port. 6 56 2.409 13.04 <.0001 
Port. 7 56 2.3 15.19 <.0001 
Port. 8 56 1.947 10.58 <.0001 
Port. 9 56 1.512 9.89 <.0001 
>0   76.78%     
Table 13: Reversal in SZSE  
(Formation dates: January 2000 - December 2004) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 60 -0.273 -0.99 0.328 
Loser 60 0.248 0.86 0.3937 
Loser - Winner 60 0.521 6.38 <.0001 
Port. 2 60 0.251 0.92 0.362 
Port. 3 60 0.282 1.1 0.2745 
Port. 4 60 0.373 1.43 0.1572 
Port. 5 60 0.297 1.13 0.2618 
Port. 6 60 0.235 0.9 0.3692 
Port. 7 60 0.184 0.7 0.484 
Port. 8 60 0.183 0.68 0.4963 
Port. 9 60 0.23 0.81 0.4204 
>0   83.33%     
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Tables 15 to 17 show the reversal for China’s stock market separated into three time periods 
for Type A stocks. The months when the portfolios are formed are shown in the formation 
dates beginning every table, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
Table 15: Reversal in China’s Type A stocks 
(Formation dates: March 1995 - December 1999) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 56 1.887 8.35 <.0001 
Loser 56 3.079 15.34 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 56 1.192 12.04 <.0001 
Port. 2 56 2.61 21.77 <.0001 
Port. 3 56 2.641 19.6 <.0001 
Port. 4 56 2.728 18.59 <.0001 
Port. 5 56 2.439 19.85 <.0001 
Port. 6 56 2.512 17.68 <.0001 
Port. 7 56 2.262 16.04 <.0001 
Port. 8 56 2.274 16.55 <.0001 
Port. 9 56 1.868 13.76 <.0001 
>0   91.07%     
Table 14: Reversal in SZSE  
(Formation dates: January 2005 – November 2007) 
 Variable  N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 35 2.918 14.59 <.0001 
Loser 35 3.844 16.61 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 35 0.926 10.37 <.0001 
Port. 2 35 3.818 16.48 <.0001 
Port. 3 35 3.674 16.89 <.0001 
Port. 4 35 3.603 17.34 <.0001 
Port. 5 35 3.491 16.78 <.0001 
Port. 6 35 3.444 16.23 <.0001 
Port. 7 35 3.32 16.21 <.0001 
Port. 8 35 3.171 16.23 <.0001 
Port. 9 35 3.285 16.77 <.0001 
>0 
 
97.14% 
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Table 16: Reversal in China’s Type A stocks 
(Formation dates: January 2000 - December 2004) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 60 -0.31 -1.06 0.2925 
Loser 60 0.167 0.6 0.5503 
Loser - Winner 60 0.477 9.54 <.0001 
Port. 2 60 0.297 1.1 0.2758 
Port. 3 60 0.285 1.07 0.2883 
Port. 4 60 0.331 1.23 0.2235 
Port. 5 60 0.276 1.04 0.3037 
Port. 6 60 0.23 0.85 0.3972 
Port. 7 60 0.233 0.9 0.3714 
Port. 8 60 0.113 0.41 0.6806 
Port. 9 60 0.053 0.18 0.8576 
>0 
 
98.33% 
   
 
 
Table 17: Reversal in China’s Type A stocks 
(Formation dates: January 2005 – November 2007) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 35 3.161 13.89 <.0001 
Loser 35 3.895 19.51 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 35 0.734 8.83 <.0001 
Port. 2 35 3.894 18.21 <.0001 
Port. 3 35 3.807 17.4 <.0001 
Port. 4 35 3.738 17.54 <.0001 
Port. 5 35 3.567 17.52 <.0001 
Port. 6 35 3.542 16.71 <.0001 
Port. 7 35 3.369 16.24 <.0001 
Port. 8 35 3.288 15.52 <.0001 
Port. 9 35 3.219 15.02 <.0001 
>0 
 
91.42% 
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Tables 18 to 20 show the reversal for China’s stock market separated into three time periods 
for Type B stocks. The months when the portfolios are formed are shown in the formation 
dates beginning every table, with some months excluded due to the unavailability of data. 
Table 18: Reversals in China’s Type B stocks 
 (Formation dates: March 1995 – December 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Reversals in China’s Type B stocks  
(Formation dates: January 2000 - December 2004) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 60 0.396 1.24 0.221 
Loser 60 0.471 1.82 0.0738 
Loser – Winner 60 0.074 0.43 0.666 
Port. 2 60 0.836 3.55 0.0008 
Port. 3 60 0.839 3.65 0.0006 
Port. 4 60 0.876 3.75 0.0004 
Port. 5 60 0.584 2.37 0.0209 
Port. 6 60 0.803 3.29 0.0017 
Port. 7 60 0.66 2.57 0.0127 
Port. 8 60 0.495 1.73 0.0884 
Port. 9 60 0.546 1.81 0.0758 
>0   63.33%     
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 54 1.873 8.82 <.0001 
Loser 54 2.365 6.59 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 54 0.492 1.67 0.1008 
Port. 2 54 3.296 8.87 <.0001 
Port. 3 54 3.089 7.93 <.0001 
Port. 4 54 2.812 6.88 <.0001 
Port. 5 54 2.782 6.2 <.0001 
Port. 6 54 2.449 5.88 <.0001 
Port. 7 54 2.118 5.39 <.0001 
Port. 8 54 2.044 6.64 <.0001 
Port. 9 54 1.84 7.35 <.0001 
>0   60.25%     
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Table 20: Reversals in China’s Type B stocks 
(Formation dates: January 2005 – November 2007) 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 35 2.256 13.14 <.0001 
Loser 35 3.026 9.4 <.0001 
Loser – Winner 35 0.77 4.3 0.0001 
Port. 2 35 2.847 12.06 <.0001 
Port. 3 35 2.715 12.92 <.0001 
Port. 4 35 2.793 13.62 <.0001 
Port. 5 35 2.557 13.35 <.0001 
Port. 6 35 2.589 13.96 <.0001 
Port. 7 35 2.262 12.46 <.0001 
Port. 8 35 2.046 10.35 <.0001 
Port. 9 35 1.751 10.04 <.0001 
>0   68.57%     
 
 
Table 21 shows the analysis without January. With formation dates between 
March 1995 and November 2007, excluding the month of January. The 
formation and holding period become 33 months, instead of 36 months due to 
the exclusion of January. 
 
Table 21: Reversal in the whole of China’s stock market  
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
Returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winner 141 1.029 5.52 <.0001 
Loser 141 2.257 10.15 <.0001 
Loser - Winner 141 1.228 7.93 <.0001 
Port. 2 141 2.006 10.44 <.0001 
Port. 3 141 1.71 10.21 <.0001 
Port. 4 141 1.654 9.89 <.0001 
Port. 5 141 1.668 9.94 <.0001 
Port. 6 141 1.558 9.65 <.0001 
Port. 7 141 1.367 8.65 <.0001 
Port. 8 141 1.393 8.51 <.0001 
Port. 9 141 1.166 7.3 <.0001 
>0 
 
85.82% 
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In Tables 21 and 22, stocks are separated by low and high book-to-market 
value. The months when the portfolios are formed are shown in the formation 
dates beginning every table, with some months excluded due to the 
unavailability of data 
 
Table 22: Low book-to-market stocks 
Formation dates: March 1995 – November 2007 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winners 133 0.647 3.13 0.0022 
Losers 133 1.705 8.61 <.0001 
Losers-Winners 133 1.058 13.95 <.0001 
Port. 2 133 1.591 7.97 <.0001 
Port. 3 133 1.531 7.94 <.0001 
Port. 4 133 1.501 8.06 <.0001 
Port. 5 133 1.409 7.79 <.0001 
Port. 6 133 1.126 6.19 <.0001 
Port. 7 133 0.95 5.29 <.0001 
Port. 8 133 1.01 5.42 <.0001 
Port. 9 133 0.956 4.83 <.0001 
>0 
 
92.48% 
   
Table 23: High book-to-market stocks 
Formation dates: March 1995 – November 2007 
Variable N 
(months) 
Mean 
returns 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Winners 144 1.383 10.1 <.0001 
Losers 144 1.921 9.78 <.0001 
Losers-Winners 144 0.538 4.71 <.0001 
Port. 2 144 1.904 10.61 <.0001 
Port. 3 144 1.84 10.98 <.0001 
Port. 4 144 1.837 11.03 <.0001 
Port. 5 144 1.817 11.08 <.0001 
Port. 6 144 1.686 10.43 <.0001 
Port. 7 144 1.736 11.38 <.0001 
Port. 8 144 1.624 10.74 <.0001 
Port. 9 144 1.664 11.63 <.0001 
>0 
 
66.66% 
   
